Some overwrought commentary has been going around regarding President Trump’s desire to hold a military parade. One member of Congress, in fact, proclaimed that “we have a Napoleon in the making.” Meh. Such processions have lumbered down streets or through inland waterways many times in the past, yet never has any past president become a Napoleon. Yes, the little emperor doubtless liked a good parade. So did Harry Truman after World War II, and so did George Bush after Desert Storm. If political leaders of all persuasions enjoy martial pageantry, chances are such parades tell us little if anything about the character or ambitions of any one leader. Pomp is good politics.

In fact, New York City hosts a naval parade every year, doing our democracy little evident damage. I had the good fortune to take part in Fleet Week ’91, just after returning from the Gulf. (Mark Twain once declared that travel is fatal to prejudice, and so it is. New Yorkers couldn’t have been more hospitable to us sailors during Fleet Week — or done more to belie their reputation for surliness.) And yet New York goes on, free of military rule.

I personally see little need for a parade — but let’s not get carried away at its implications.

Tonight on my regular gig with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang on WABC radio in New York, the co-hosts drew attention anew to China’s seizure, “reclamation”—a.k.a. fabrication—and fortification of atolls and reefs in the South China Sea.

Two quick points, and an observation from one of the masters of strategy. One, China uses Westerners’ generosity deftly against us: while we debate China’s motives, affording it the benefit of the doubt, China forges ahead with its next move. Our forbearance constitutes Beijing’s opportunity. We’re always behind.

Two, militarized islands are mainly peacetime assets, useful for deterring Southeast Asian neighbors from challenging China’s unlawful territorial claims. They would probably prove untenable in wartime, but that’s beside the point. They are adjuncts to China’s small-stick diplomacy (click here).

And for the big-think observation, Moltke the Elder insisted the strongest form of war was strategic offense combined with tactical defense. In other words, grab something you want, hold it, and dare your opponent to come and take it back—and make himself look like a bully and a warmonger in the process.

Advantage: Beijing. However contemptible China’s motives, you’ve got to admire its strategic dexterity.

 

 

 

 

 

Over at the Naval Institute Proceedings this month (click here), Admiral Sandy Winnefeld urges the U.S. Navy surface fleet to embrace principles that govern operations in the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, which has posted an unblemished record for safety. Admiral Winnefeld is righter than he knows. Drawing up a list of principles is necessary but insufficient. Reforming the surface navy will involve breaking the culture that permitted last year’s spate of accidents to happen – and replacing that culture with something healthier.

The vile Gordon Chang has the temerity to rebut my rebuttal of his article claiming that China wants conflict in the South China Sea. I say aggressors like China love peace but accept conflict if they can’t get their way without force of arms. That’s a distinction with a difference.

Gordon’s original article is at The National Interest here, my rebuttal is here, and his latest entry is here. Check it out!

Beware the Naval Diplomat’s Fist of Fury, Gordon . . . .